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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
S I A l l 0 1 !H!/,> Jill . 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOHNLELEAE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated assault, a second degree felony, 
i n \ m l i l i i i» in H I ! I hi i h l 11 ill I ' mi in in in in II III i il  II " i ' 1 ' 11 i l l II II in* II II in in ill l i in l in i . i l n i M t i i I I n i l iiiiii 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
STATEMENl Ut 1HL ISSUES UIN AiThAL AINU 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was there sufficient evidence of "serious bodily injury" to convict defendant of 
aggravated assault? "[The reviewing] court reverses a jury verdict only if, after viewing 
all the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to that verdict, it 
I • 'fficientl;; uirnin IIISIM1 or inlirn ni l , miprnhihU' lli,il RMSon.iblt1 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime 
Case No. 981189-CA 
Priority No 2 
of which he was convicted.""9 State v. Baker. 963 P.2d 801, 809 (Utah App. 1998) 
(quoting State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 
443,444 (Utah 1983))). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to voir dire the jury panel with 
questions proposed by defendant and in denying a challenge to a juror for cause? A trial 
court's decision to limit questioning injury voir dire is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
State v. Piansiaksone. 954 P.2d 861, 868 (Utah 1998). See also State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (trial court's rejection of a challenge for cause to a particular 
juror reviewed for abuse of broad discretion to impanel a fair and impartial jury). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion under rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
in refusing to admit defendant's inadmissible recorded hearsay statements requested to 
purportedly clarify a witness's testimony? In reviewing a trial court's rulings on 
evidence, the appellate court will generally allow the trial court "a good deal of 
discretion." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994) (citing Russell v. Russell. 852 
P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1993) ("Rule 611(a) allows the court to 'exercise reasonable control 
over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) 
make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, [and] 
(2) avoid needless consumption of time ' Utah R. Evid. 611(a).")). See J.Weinstein, 
M. Berger, & J. McLaughlin, Weinstein's Evidence % 106[01] at. p. 106-4 (noting that 
rule 611(a) provides control over testimonial proof equivalent to rule 106's control over 
2 
writings and recorded statements). 
4 Shot lid till: lis C :>i lr I: clc d n i l s n u i s t i t u t i n n a l c h a l l e n y c s 
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) ("group criminal activities" enhancement) until 
the Utah Supreme Court rules on the State's petition for rehearing in State v. Lopes, No. 
960551 (Utah March 16, 1999)? This issue is a matter of this Court's discretion. 
fi I  I  II11 H t t n i l l 1 U H I S | H i t t U I l k 1 I. \M 1 U f i l l U l l k l l l l i l l I  I  I  I I HI I I U T t * Hl11l l l l l l l l l . i l 
liability, such that defendant was entitled to the lesser sentence for conspiracy under State 
v. ShondeL 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969), '"[RJeview under the Shondel rule "focuses 
on the trial court's legal conclusions, which we review under a correction-of-error 
standard, according no particular deferent * •* -^nic State v. Fisher, 
972 P.2d 90? 98 (I Jtah A >98) (citing State L. Kent 94S P.2d 145. 146 (Utah 
1997) (quoting State v. Vogt. 824 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1991))). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are attached at 
A dden- : i i i 1 1 1 1 \ . ' * . • ' '• ' .' • •' •. •' •. •• •- • , - .' • 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, John Leleae, was charged with attempted criminal homicide or, in the 
alternative, aggravated assaull (K s i - Mi) A jui \ UHH icted defendant of aggravated 
assaiill iR 'Mill lln In ill 1 mill snilrm ed defendant In w 'il.ilulnn lorin t MI ilia? 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) ("group criminal activities 
enhancement'') to a six-to-fifteen year term in the Utah State Prison (R. 351-52). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At about 9:45 p.m. on May 10, 1997, Kenny Brems was driving his Ford pickup-
truck near the intersection of 3500 South and 4800 West in West Valley City, listening to 
the radio, headed home (R. 378:93-98). As Brems turned east onto 3500 South, he 
noticed a blue Chevrolet Monte Carlo in the lane to his right (R. 378:97, 168). As he 
approached 4400 West, just before the point where construction barricades forced a 
narrowing of the road from four to only two lanes, Brems heard two "pops" in close 
succession (R. 378:98, 101). Not knowing what the popping sounds were, and thinking 
that something might be wrong with his truck, Brems turned the radio down. Just as he 
entered the intersection, Brems heard a third "pop," at which instant the rear window of 
his truck shattered (R. 378:98-102). Brems instantly recognized that someone was 
shooting at him (R. 378:102). 
Intending to disable the smaller Monte Carlo, Brems backed his pickup into it. 
Amid spinning wheels, noise and smoke, Brems forced the Monte Carlo back into another 
car, but only succeeded in stalling his truck (R. 378:103-04). Too scared to even try to 
start his truck, Brems jumped out and began to run down 3500 South to escape and get 
some help. At the same moment, the Brems saw two male Pacific Islanders jump out 
from the driver's side of the Monte Carlo. One of them, who Brems identified as 
defendant, had a gun (R. 378:104-05, 112-114). One of the men wore light-colored or 
4 
t i l l I • ... . • ' 
Unsuccessful in getting help from the first four drivers he tried, Brems found Earl 
Bramhall in his car, and screamed at him to call the police, which Brimhall was already 
doing on his cellular phone (R. 378:105, 166-67). At this point, Brems relaxed because 
the Monte Car I ;:> ai id its occupants were some distance away, and other people were 
beginning to gath However, Brems watched Brimhar '*. \ c^ ;vr h i ^v r 
and heard him yell, "Look out! Look out!" (R. 378:106). Brems turned and saw the 
Monte Carlo come around his truck, run over two barricades, and bear down on him (R. 
1 tsrems realized that his pursuers were trying to hit him. He tried to jump 
( I III I I I If'1 I I I III III III I i l l II Ill III III III III III III III III III III III III 1 1 1 1 I I I III I " III III 1 I I I I III Ill I I I III i l l i 111 III Ill III I I I «i M l I 111 I I I I III \ L 
378:106-07). 
Again, defendant still holding a gun and the second man, jumped out of the Monte 
Carlo. The second man asked why Brems had backed into his car. As Brems asserted 
t l n f l l m had turn Inuitim' ,ii II 1111 m ,i Ilium I i up ml nil 11 if 
Brems remembers is being beaten and begging for his life (R. 378:107, 112-15, 134).l 
Although Brems knew that he was being attacked by more than one assailant, he could 
not be sure whether defendant was one of them (R. 37 s:. Brems remembered that the 
1
 Although Brems did not know the names of his assailants, at trial he correctly 
identified defendant by his long hair, in a pony tail at the time of the incident (R. 378: 
113-14, 145-46), and defendant's cohorts, Edwin Seumanu (who was angry about the 
Monte Carlo), by his "bushy, straight up" hair (State's Ex. 25; R. 378:107, 114, 143-44; 
379:124), and Viliamu Seumano by his hair and similar appearance to his brother Edwin 
(State's Ex. 24; R 378:115. 144-45). . 
5 
individual who initially began to beat him as the companion of defendant, the individual 
with the gun (R. 378:114-15). 
Brems suffered some minor head injuries and a broken jaw. Surgery was 
performed at St. Mark's Hospital, where braces and wires were applied to his teeth and 
mouth, fully immobilizing his jaw and preventing him from opening his mouth at all for a 
month and a half (R. 378:108-09). Brems also had a front tooth pulled so that he could 
ingest food through a straw (R. 378:109). During this period, Brems could eat nothing 
but liquified foods which he ingested by squeezing through the spaces between his teeth 
(R. 378:109). Brems lost about twenty pounds during this period, at the end of which he 
was losing about one pound each day (R. 378:110-11). 
Brems tooth was put back in about a week after his jaw was unwired (R. 378:109-
10). It took "quite a while" for Brems' jaw to recover. After the wires were removed, it 
was "real hard" to eat, and he was unable to begin eating solid food for another two or 
three weeks. However, while his jaw felt "pretty good" at time of trial, more than six 
months after the incident, Brems, a serviceman by profession, was still unable to hold a 
flashlight in his mouth on account of the pain (R. 378:110). 
When Brems retrieved his truck a few days after the incident, he found a bullet 
hole in the front part of the sleeper compartment, and the differential also had a bullet 
ding (R. 378:116). 
Kevin Lubbers was the driver of the car into which Brems's truck forced the 
6 
Monte Carlo (R. 378:149-50). After the crash, he saw three people, one of whom was a 
passenger who had a gun, get out of the Monte Carlo and start to chase the driver of the 
truck (R. 378:151-52). He ran to the nearby Conoco station, but other witnesses were 
already calling the police (R. 378:152). He then saw the Monte Carlo pull forward and 
proceed to hit another car. From a distance of about fifty yards he saw three individuals 
chase Brems. Although he was not close enough to see which of the truck driver's 
pursuers was assaulting Brems, "I did see that they were all beating up on this guy" (R. 
378:153,161). 
Earl Bramhall, driver of the car into which the Monte Carlo smashed, confirmed 
that he observed the Monte Carlo bear down on Brems as Brems sought help from him 
(R. 378:168). The Monte Carlo took out the whole left side of his car and hit Brems in 
the legs, knocking him to the ground (R. 378:168-71). Three "Islanders or Samoans" 
were in the Monte Carlo. The driver hollered at Brems, "I am the motherfucker that tried 
to blow your head off," and he and the front seat passenger jumped out of the car and 
began beating Brems as he lay on the ground (R. 378:169-71, 176). The rear seat 
passenger also exited, holding a large caliber handgun, which he threw back into the car 
before joining his companions in beating up Brems (R. 378:170-71). Although the fracas 
moved toward a fence thirty to forty feet from BramhalFs car, Bramhall identified 
defendant to police at the scene of the incident as a participant in the victim's beating (R. 
378:181, 186-87). 
7 
Duane Banks, also stopped in his car, witnessed the Monte Carlo hit Brems, after 
which three or four Pacific Islanders "came pouring out of the car," caught Brems as he 
limped away, and pulled him up against a fence and started beating him up (R. 378:187-
91). He saw no indication that any of Brems three assailants tried to stop the beating (R. 
378:191). 
Officer Julia Jorgenson of the West Valley City Police Department, arrived at the 
scene within a minute and a half of receiving a "shots fired, man-with-a-gun call (R. 378: 
205-08). There she encountered a large group of very angry men consisting of about five 
Polynesians and two Caucasians (R. 378:208-09). Two of the men wore airline baggage 
handler type uniforms, the other three wore oversized clothing (R. 378:209). These latter 
three, whom she identified as defendant and the Seumanu brothers, "were very upset, 
very angry . . . clinching their fists and flexing their shoulders, as we were trying to bring 
them away from the fence and towards us" (R. 378:209, 218-20; State's Ex. 24 and 25; 
Def.'s Ex. 1). Officer Jorgenson, concerned that these three men were still moving 
around and disobeying police commands, immediately retrieved the .44 magnum revolver 
she saw on the passenger seat of the Monte Carlo (R. 378:210). Examining the gun, she 
found five spent shell casings (R. 378:211). 
Officer William McCarthy, responding to a radio call, arrived at the scene first, 
immediately before Officer Jorgenson (R. 378:214,221-23). He saw a woman leading 
Brems away and three Islanders, who he identified as defendant and the Seumanu 
8 
brothers, who appeared to be fighting with two other Islanders wearing Delta airline 
uniforms, who were attempting to restrain defendant and his cohorts (R. 378:223-24; R. 
379:15; State's Ex. 24 and 25; Def.'s Ex. 1). Officer McCarthy ordered all five to sit on 
the curb (R. 378:224). The two Islanders in the Delta Airlines uniforms were "very 
compliant" (R. 378:225). However, defendant and his companions would not 
follow any directions until another officer arrived with a police dog (R. 378:225). 
Following the arrest of defendant and the Seumanu brothers, Officer McCarthy put 
defendant and Viliamu in his patrol car, which contained video equipment that had been 
automatically activated when the overheads lights were turned on (R. 378: 
228-29; R. 379:23). Officer McCarthy told defendant and his companion that they had 
no expectation of privacy in his patrol car (R. 378:229). Defendant's conversation with 
Viliamu was recorded and thereafter transcribed (R. 379:8-10; 379:29; State's Ex. 29). 
Kevin Nudd, detective with the West Valley City Police Department, arrived at the 
scene sometime after 10:00 p.m. (R. 379:21, 23). He was informed by Officer Terrell 
that defendant and Viliamu Seumanu were in Officer McCarthy's patrol car (R. 379:23). 
He identified the bullet that was retrieved from the headliner of Brems's truck (R. 379:25-
26). He also noted that the .44 magnum Black Hawk Ruger retrieved from the Monte 
Carlo is one of the largest caliber handguns made (R. 379:45). 
Detective Nudd also interviewed defendant the night of the incident (R. 379:28-
29). After being read and then waiving his Miranda rights, defendant first denied even 
9 
being in the Monte Carlo and claimed that he was a pedestrian who had witnessed the 
automobile accident (R. 379:29-31). Although, defendant claimed also that he had just 
met the Seumanu brothers that night in a park, he changed his story about how he arrived 
at the scene several times during the interview (R. 379:31). Defendant then claimed that 
he approached two guys in a car, that one of them had fired a gun, and that after directing 
the wielder of the gun to put it back in the car he got a hold of it and put it in the car 
himself (R. 379: 33-34). Defendant went on to say that these two guys got out of the car, 
chased the victim and began beating him up when he interceded to break up the fight (R. 
379:31-34). 
Upon Detective Nudd's informing defendant that his conversation in Officer 
McCarthy's patrol car had been videotaped, defendant claimed he would tell the truth and 
changed his story concerning his involvement in the incident (R. 379:35-36). Defendant 
claimed that Viliamu was "always getting into situations," and blamed Viliamu for 
getting him into the situation (R. 379:36). Defendant claimed he had been drinking beer 
with the Seumanus in a park and then gotten a ride in the Monte Carlo from its owner, 
Edwin, the same person who had shot the gun (R. 379:36-37). Defendant said that later 
he took over the driving because Edwin was drunk and that he was driving during the 
shooting (R. 379:37). After Brems backed his truck into the their car, Edwin and Viliamu 
chased Brems, but returned to their car, at which point Edwin drove (R. 379:37). Edwin, 
defendant claimed, tried to hit Brems, after which Edwin and Viliamu got out of the car 
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and began assaulting Brems (R. 379:38). Defendant again asserted that he tried to pull 
Edwin and Viliamu off Brems, expressing to Detective Nudd his ambivalence about 
supporting his friends by either taking part in the beating or refraining (R. 379:38-40).2 
Debra Bryant testified for the defense that she witnessed the incident from the 
point at which Brems backed into the Monte Carlo (R. 379:80-83). After seeing the 
Monte Carlo hit Bramhall's car, she saw the Seumanu brothers assault the victim, 
constantly hitting him in the face (R. 379:83, 86-87; Def.'s Ex. 2 and 4). She entreated 
that they stop, begging them to allow the police to handle the matter while grabbing at 
one of the attacker's arms (R. 379:84). Notwithstanding her status as a defense witness, 
Ms. Byrant testified that at some point a third person appeared, who also beat the victim 
in the face (R. 379:85, 87). 
Testifying for defendant, Edwin Seumanu stated that he left a park in his blue 
Monte Carlo with his brother, Viliamu, and defendant, but, having drunk "a lot" of beer, 
turned the driving over to defendant. He acknowledged that there was a gun beneath the 
driver's seat (R. 379:94-99, 111-12). While they were driving, a truck kept coming up 
and then dropping back behind his car, kept "highlighting" his car, to wit: repeatedly 
switching from low to high beams, and then forced its way in front of his car (R. 379:99-
2
 Defendant's asserted ambivalent response to the assault on Brems is the subject 
of defendant's claim (Point III) that the trial court erred in denying his request to 
introduce additional portions of his statement to Detective Nudd. A more complete 
rendition of the facts related to that claim is set out at Point III of this brief. 
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101). At that point Edwin started firing his gun "straight up in the air'9 (R. 379:101, 112). 
Angered by Brems backing into his car, Edwin jumped out of the car, along with 
defendant (R. 379:102). Abandoning an attempt to catch the fleeing Brems, Edwin 
returned to the car, got into the driver's seat, and began searching for the victim (R. 
379:104-06). Seeing the victim next to a car, Edwin turned the Monte Carlo towards 
Brems only to block his escape, but in trying to stop the car "was still kind of rolling a 
little bit" (R. 379:107). Edwin then jumped out of the car, grabbed the victim and began 
beating him. Edwin's brother joined him in beating the victim (R. 379:108-09). Edwin 
said that he did not see defendant there; however, he also acknowledged that he did not 
notice what defendant was doing and that it was not defendant, but rather two other 
Polynesians who pulled him off the victim (R. 379:109, 114-16). 
Defendant testified that he just met the Seumanu brothers on the night of May 10 
(R. 381:14-15). His testimony generally tracked Edwin's story to the point where Edwin 
fired the gun, although defendant acknowledged that it was he who first cut Brems off 
(R. 381:17-24, 66-67). At that point, defendant asserted that he really wanted to turn the 
car around, but was afraid Edwin might shoot him (R. 381:24). When Brems backed into 
the Monte Carlo, defendant got out and examined the damage (R. 381:28). He also 
retrieved the gun from Edwin, who was out of the car and threw the gun back into the car 
(R. 381:29-30). Defendant asserted that when Edwin and Viliamu caught up with Brems 
and beat him, defendant pulled Edwin off and told Edwin, "That's enough" (R. 381:35-
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41). Defendant also denied encouraging or assisting Edwin in shooting or assaulting 
Brems (R. 381:57-58). However, on cross examination, defendant acknowledged that he 
continued to drive along the same path as Edwin fired the gun out the window three times 
(R. 381:69-72).3 Upon being confronted with a transcription of his tape recorded 
conversation with Viliamu while they were in police car, defendant also acknowledged 
concocting a story in which defendant was standing on the corner and then tried to break 
up the fight (R. 381:91-93). 
On rebuttal, in addition to pointing out a series of prior inconsistent statements 
Edwin made, Detective Nudd testified that Edwin also told him that defendant would 
"help him get [the] victim" (R. 381:124). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I - There was sufficient evidence of serious bodily injury to support defendant's 
conviction for aggravated assault. As a result of a brutal assault by defendant and his 
accomplices, the victim suffered a broken jaw which had to be wired closed for six weeks 
and which, at the time of trial more than six months later, left the victim with some 
debilitation. Under the plain language of the statute and substantial relevant case law 
from other jurisdictions, the injury suffered by the victim was "protracted impairment to 
any bodily organ" sufficient to establish "serious bodily injury." 
3
 Detective Nudd testified that in order to fire the .44 magnum Ruger, it was 
necessary to cock the gun by first pulling the hammer back (R. 379:45). Defendant 
denied seeing Edwin cock the gun before each shot (R. 381:72). 
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POINT II - The court properly rejected three of defendant's proposed voir dire 
questions which asked prospective jurors whether they could weigh and credit 
defendant's testimony the same as it would other witnesses, whether a juror could remain 
resolute in the face of a majority holding a contrary opinion, and whether the juror could 
follow the cautionary eyewitness instruction. Since the trial court repeatedly inquired to 
its satisfaction whether the jury could weigh the evidence fairly and impartially and 
admonished the jury that it must follow the court's instructions on the law, defendant was 
given a sufficient opportunity to intelligently exercise his peremptory strikes. Also, the 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove for cause a juror having only a 
remote and insubstantial connection with a juror who affirmed his ability to be fair and 
impartial. 
POINT HI - The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit parts of 
defendant's post-arrest interview statement, requested by defendant to purportedly clarify 
a detective's testimony, under rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence. Because rule 106 
applies only to writings or recorded statements, and because the remarks sought to be 
admitted were inadmissible hearsay, rule 106 does not apply. Also, the detective's 
testimony accurately summarized defendant's post-arrest comments, which would have 
been prejudicial if admitted in their entirety. 
POINT IV - The State requests that this Court defer ruling on defendant's challenges to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) ("group criminal activities" enhancement) until the 
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Utah Supreme Court rules on the State's petition for rehearing in State v. Lopes. No. 
960551 (Utah March 16, 1999) (requiring proof to a jury beyond reasonable doubt of "in 
concert" element of "new crime"). Alternatively, any error in consequence of Lopes 
should be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because at the time of 
defendant's sentencing his accomplices had pleaded guilty to offenses rising out of the 
same criminal episode, thereby establishing beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's 
participation with two or more individuals. 
POINT V - Defendant is not entitled to a lesser sentence under the Shondel rule 
because conspiracy and "in concert" criminal liability are not equivalent offenses. 
Conspiracy requires proof of an agreement to commit a crime, an element absent from 
accomplice liability. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I - THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 
THE VICTIM SUFFERED SERIOUS BODILY INJURY 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss (R. 
379:77) in which he claimed that the evidence of aggravated assault was insufficient 
because the victim did not suffer "serious bodily injury," i.e. "protracted loss or 
impairment," as defined by the statute. Br. of App. at 14-18. However, not only is 
defendant's logic in support of his argument flawed, but also the plain language of the 
statute clearly embraces the injuries suffered by the victim, as a number of other state 
courts construing virtually identical statutory language have found. 
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In order to successfully challenge a jury's verdict the reviewing court must find 
that the evidence and inferences based on that evidence were so "inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree. 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded bv rule on other grounds. State v. Walker. 
743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987) . In undertaking such review, the appellate court will "view 
the evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from it, in the light most favorable 
to the verdict." State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah pp. 1990) (citation omitted). 
"[S]o long as some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, [the 
reviewing court] will not disturb them." Id, (citing State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 
345 (Utah 1985)). 
In this case, Brems suffered the following injuries and impairments: 
- minor head injuries and a broken jaw (R. 378:108-09); 
- surgery to apply braces and wires to his teeth, fully immobilizing his jaw 
and preventing him from opening his mouth at all for a month and a half 
(R. 378:108-09); 
- removal of a front tooth to allow ingestion of food through a straw (R. 378:109); 
- diet limited to only liquified foods, ingested by squeezing through the spaces 
between his teeth (R. 378:109); 
- lost of about twenty pounds during this period, at the end of which Brems 
was losing about one pound each day (R. 378:110-11); 
- difficulty in eating after removal of wires and inability to eat solid for an 
additional two to three weeks (R. 378:110); 
- jaw "pretty good" at time of trial, more than six months after the incident, but 
Brems, a serviceman by profession, was still unable to hold a flashlight in 
his mouth on account of the pain (R. 378:110). 
"A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 
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76-5-102 and he intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another[.]" Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103(l)(a) (Supp. 1998).4 "'Serious bodily injury' means bodily injury that creates 
or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function 
of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-601(10) (Supp. 1998): see State v. Gardner. 947 P.2d 630, 651 (Utah 1997) ("A 
broken arm, foot, or even finger would satisfy [Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103.5(2)(b)'s] 
definition of serious bodily injury as 'protracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member/" citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10)). 
Recognizing that his conviction for aggravated assault could be based only on a 
showing of "protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member," 
defendant essentially claims that the phrase is ambiguous because it does not adequately 
define the period of time embraced by the term "protracted." Br. of App. at 16. 
Purporting to clarify the term, defendant urges this Court to apply the doctrine of noscitur 
a sociis, "it is known from its associates," whereby "protracted impairment" denotes 
injury equal to the other terms defining "serious bodily injury," and is distinct from those 
terms defining "substantial bodily injury," which also should denote equivalent injuries.5 
4
 Defendant was not charged under the alternative variant for aggravated assault 
(R. 54). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b) (defendant "under circumstances not 
amounting to a violation of subsection (l)(a), [defendant] uses a dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury"). 
5
 "'Substantial bodily injury9 means bodily injury, not amounting to serious 
bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or 
temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." Utah 
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Br. of App. at 17. From this analysis defendant gratuitously asserts that the impairment 
Brems suffered, to wit: a broken jaw wired shut for six weeks during which he loss 
twenty pounds, was not serious bodily injury equivalent to that which "creates serious 
permanent disfigurement... or creates a substantial risk of death," but rather "temporary 
loss or impairment" comparable to "protracted physical pain [or] temporary 
disfigurement." Br. of App. at 17-18. In other words, the victim suffered only 
"substantial" but not "serious" bodily injury. Br. of App. at 18. Defendant concludes by 
providing a per se definition for "serious bodily injury" as it may pertain to a broken 
bone: "In sum, any broken bone which is not life threatening and heals normally in the 
usual time frame should be considered a temporary loss or impairment of function, 
making the injury 'substantial bodily injury.'" Br. of App. at 18. Defendant's argument 
fails for several reasons. 
"A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are to be construed 
according to their plain language." O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd„ 956 P.2d 279, 
281 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). "Only if the language of a statute is ambiguous do we 
resort to other modes of construction." Id. "Furthermore, unambiguous language may 
not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning." Id. "A corollary of this rule is that 'a 
statutory term should be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted 
meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is neither 
Code Ann. § 76-1-601(1 l)(Supp. 1998). 
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unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of 
the statute.'" Id 
"Protracted impairment," notwithstanding an understandable lack of absolute 
precision, is not ambiguous, but rather has a clearly understood meaning. See 2A 
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.16 (5th ed. 1992) ("The rule 
[noscitur a sociis] will not be applied where there is no ambiguity "). Indeed, several 
courts have rejected claims challenging the sufficiency of evidence of "protracted 
impairment" under virtually identical aggravated assault statutes by simple resort to 
dictionary definition.6 
Even if there were some ambiguity in the term "protracted impairment," at least 
6
 Walker v. State, 742 P.2d 790, 791 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) ("Protracted is 
defined as 'to draw out or lengthen in time or space.'") (quoting Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 1826 (1966)), State v. Welton, 300 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Iowa 
1981) (same); State v. Mentola. 691 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (citing 
dictionary definition and noting that "protracted" is "[o]bviously . . . something short of 
permanent, but more than of short duration. What is considered protracted depends on 
the circumstances."); State v. Pettit. 976 S.W.2d 585, 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (same). 
Additionally, courts applying the language of their aggravated assault statutes 
which contain virtually identical operative phrases to that of the Utah "serious bodily 
injury" definition ("protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member 
or organ") have uniformly found evidence sufficient on facts remarkably similar to those 
in this case: Walker, 742 P.2d at 791 (broken jaw wired shut for six weeks preventing 
victim from chewing); People v. Fosselman. 659 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Cal. 1983) (broken 
jaw wired shut for three weeks); Welton, 300 N.W.2d at 159-61 (broken jaw wired shut 
preventing chewing of food); State v. Diaz. 612 So. 2d 1019, 1021-23 (La. Ct. App. 1993) 
(fractured jaw wired together and immobilized for seven weeks necessitating restricted 
liquid diet); State v. Bridgeforth. 357 N.W.2d 393, 394 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (loss of 
tooth); Pettit 976 S.W.2d at 592 (inability to walk without severe pain for three weeks 
after gunshot wound); Mentola, 691 S.W.2d at 421-22 (broken jaw wired shut for six 
weeks still felt numb and painful at time of trial); Commonw. v. Nichols. 692 A.2d 181, 
184 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (broken jaw wired shut for six weeks during which victim could 
take only liquid food through a straw); Commonw. v. Davis. 406 A.2d 1087, 1089 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1979) (multiply fractured jaw wired closed for six weeks). 
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one court has rejected substantially the same analysis proposed by defendant in this case. 
In Welton. the defendant was convicted of "willful injury," the precise equivalent of 
aggravated assault as defined sections 76-5-103 and 76-1-601, by breaking the victim's 
jaw. Welton. 300 N.W.2d at 159. As a result of the attack, the victim's jaw was wired 
shut for six weeks, during which time the victim ingested only liquid food through her 
teeth and lost twenty-five pounds. Id Challenging the evidence showing a "protracted 
loss or impairment" sufficient to constitute willful injury, the defendant argued that the 
victim's injuries did not rise to the level of the other definitions embraced by the statutory 
definition of "serious bodily injury," to wit: "disabling mental illness, substantial risk of 
death, and serious permanent disfigurement." IdL at 160 (citing Iowa Code § 702.18 
(1979)). The Iowa Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's argument, noting that 
"[protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ] is 
consistent with the other three definitions." Id, Effectively contemplating defendant's 
argument in this case, the Welton court concluded: 
Standard rules are difficult to formulate, and each case must be 
determined by its own peculiar facts. All bone fracture may not constitute a 
"protracted loss or impairment." However, the fracture in this case, which 
substantially impaired the victim's health, made a jury question under the 
statute. 
Id at 161. See also State v. Kelly, 942 P.2d 579, 584 (Kan. 1997) (noting that whether 
harm is sufficiently "great" to constitute aggravated battery is "generally a question of 
fact for the jury") (citation omitted). In this case, the trial court also correctly recognized 
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that the evidence was sufficient to submit the charge to the jury (R. 379:76-77). 
However, even if defendant's statutory construction argument were accepted, his 
insufficiency claim would fail on the facts. At the time of trial, more than six months 
after the incident, Brems' jaw was still not completely healed, evidenced by his inability 
to hold a flashlight in his mouth on account of the pain, a condition that impaired his 
ability to work (R. 378:110). In sum, there was sufficient evidence to show that 
defendant's acts caused the victim to suffer protracted impairment in the use of his jaw. 
POINT II - THE VOIR DIRE CONDUCTED BY THE COURT PROVIDED THE 
DEFENDANT WITH A FAIR TRIAL AND WAS WELL WITHIN 
THE COURT'S DISCRETION. 
A. The Court's Voir Dire Covered the Legitimate Subjects of Inquiry 
Addressed in Defendant's Supplemental Voir Dire, Allowing 
Defendant an Adequate Opportunity to Evaluate the Jurors, 
Defendant appeals the decision of the trial court not to ask three supplemental 
questions he proposed for jury voir dire: 
26. If Mr. Leleae were to testify, would you give his testimony the same weight 
and credit that you would give to any other witness? 
41. If, after hearing the evidence, you came to the conclusion that the prosecution 
had not proven the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and you 
found that at majority of the jurors believed the defendant was guilty, would 
you change your verdict only because you were in the minority? 
49. You will later be instructed by the judge that the identification of a person as 
the perpetrator of a crime is an expression of belief or impression by the 
witness, and that many factors affect the accuracy of the identification. Do 
any of you believe that an eyewitness can never make a mistake? Would any 
of you be unable to follow the judge's instructions about looking at various 
factors which could affect the accuracy of eyewitness identification? 
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(R. 139-146; R. 378:74). See Br. of App. at 18-21. 
This Court reviews challenges to the trial court's management of jury voir dire 
under an abuse of discretion standard. Barrett v. Peterson. 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). The scope and conduct of voir dire examination is within the discretion of 
the trial judge. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798 (Utah 1991). "For a court's exercise of 
discretion in disallowing voir dire questions to be overturned, appellant must show that 
the abuse of discretion rose to the level of reversible error." State v. Hall. 797 P.2d 470, 
472 (Utah App. 1990) (citing State v. Pascoe. 774 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1989)), cert, 
denied. 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990). 
In James the court stated that "while questions covering possible bias of jurors 
must cover the subject involved, the questions asked of jurors do not need to follow any 
specific formula to pass constitutional muster." James, 819 P.2d at 797 (Utah 1991) 
(citing Mu'Min v. Virginia. 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991)) (footnotes omitted). However, 
concluding the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated does not answer the 
question of whether the trial court improperly limited voir dire. State v. Piansiaksone. 
954 P.2d 861, 867 (Utah 1998). 
Voir dire serves two distinct purposes: 1) to allow counsel to uncover biases of 
individual jurors sufficient to support a for-cause challenge and 2) to gather information 
enabling counsel to intelligently use peremptory challenges. Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 
96, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v. Sherard. 818 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah App.1991), 
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cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992), and Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456, 457 (Utah App. 
1989)). "[TJrial courts can and should conduct voir dire proceedings in a way which not 
only meets constitutional requirements, but also enables litigants . . . to intelligently 
exercise peremptory challenges and which attempts, as much as possible, to eliminate 
bias and prejudice from the trial proceedings." Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 867. Defendant 
fails not only to show he was denied his constitutional rights, but also that he was 
deprived of an intelligent exercise of his peremptory challenges. 
The first question regards the ability of the potential jurors to fairly and impartially 
evaluate defendant's testimony. This question was unnecessary. The court sufficiently 
inquired into the jurors' ability to fairly and impartially judge witness testimony. The 
court told jurors that their obligation as jurors was "to fairly and impartially listen to the 
testimonies of the various witnesses," and then "to fairly and impartially determine the 
credibility of those witnesses" and "to fairly and impartially determine what weight 
should be given to the testimony . . . " (R. 378: 8). The court asked the potential jurors if, 
following these obligations, they would not be able to apply the law as given to them by 
the court (R. 378: 10). No juror indicated that he or she could not comply (R. 378: 10). 
The second question was unnecessary for the defense to evaluate the jury panel for 
cause or peremptory challenges. The jury panel was admonished several times to keep an 
open mind and to evaluate the evidence fairly and impartially, and when asked if they 
would be able to follow the law with these obligations, no potential juror indicated 
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signaled his or her dissent (R. 378: 8, 10, 70). Additionally, this question was not to 
probe for possible or actual bias. Voir dire should be conducted in a manner that 
"enable[s] litigants and their counsel to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges and 
which attempts, as much as possible, to eliminate bias and prejudice from the trial 
proceeding." James. 819 P.2d at 798 (Utah 1991). Moreover, authority cited by 
defendant tends to reject, rather than support, the propriety of this question. See Allen v. 
United States. 164 U.S. 492, 499-502 (1896) (instructing jury to keep an open mind in the 
face of opposing majority viewpoint). 
The last question was unnecessary for the defense to evaluate the potential jurors. 
In Piansiaksone. the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to 
ask two questions that were aimed at discovering jurors who might be favorable to the 
defendant's theory of the case. Piansiaksone. 954 P.2d at 868. The questions asked 
potential jurors if they were "familiar with a circumstance in which a person accepted 
responsibility for the actions of someone else to shield the other person from blame" and 
"[w]hy would a person take responsibility for someone else." Id. 867 n.4. The court 
held that although these two questions were appropriately within the scope of voir dire, 
"the trial judge has the greatest freedom to exclude them." Id. (emphasis added). 
The rejected questions in Piansiaksone are similar to the question requested by 
defense counsel asking potential jurors if they believed that an eyewitness can ever make 
a mistake. Although the question gave lip service to the requirement that the jury follow 
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the court's instructions, it was plainly intended to identify jurors who would be amenable 
to the defendant's theory of "mistaken identity". Even if the question appropriately 
probed a juror's potential biases concerning the reliability of eyewitness testimony, it was 
subsumed by the court's firm directive that the jury follow the instructions as given by the 
court, whether or not the juror believed the law was or should be different (R. 378:9-10). 
In sum, the subjects covered by the questions requested by the defendant were 
sufficiently covered during the court's voir dire, which afforded defendant an adequate 
opportunity to evaluate the jury on for-cause and peremptory. 
B. The Court Properly Denied the For-Cause Challenge Because the Juror 
Demonstrated the Ability to be Fair and Impartial: Using a Peremptory 
Challenge to Remove the Juror did not Result in an Impartial Jury, 
Defendant challenged prospective juror Steven Wright for cause because Wright 
had a brief acquaintance with Detective Nudd many years earlier (R. 401A:264-66, 
attached at Addendum B). On appeal, defendant argues the trial court prejudicially erred 
in denying his for-cause challenge to the juror, against whom defendant used his first 
peremptory strike (R. 401A:267; R. 200). Br. of App. at 20-21.7 
A for-cause challenge is allowed under rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
7
 Although not clearly articulated on appeal, the State acknowledges that 
defendant's claim of prejudice was arguably preserved by trial counsel's not only using a 
peremptory strike against the challenged juror, but by noting that she would have used a 
peremptory strike against juror Michael Steele if she had any remaining (R. 401A:75-76). 
See State v. Baker. 935 P.2d 503, 508 (Utah 1997) ("'Initially, a defendant must establish 
that he or she exercised a peremptory challenge to remove the juror [properly removable 
for cause], exhausted the defendant's peremptory challenges, and communicated to the 
trial court the defendant's dissatisfaction with the jury selected.'") (quoting People v. 
Crittenden, 885 P.2d 887, 906-07 (Cal. 1994). 
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when there is an 
"existence of any social, legal business, fiduciary, or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to 
have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship, when 
viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective 
juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free 
of favoritism." 
U.R.Cr. P. 18(e)(4)(1998) (emphasis added). See State v. Lacev. 665 P.2d 1311, 1312 
(Utah 1983) (footnote omitted) (only "strong and deep impressions" on the part of a 
potential juror serve as the basis of a for cause removal) (citation omitted). 
In State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989), the juror had known the prosecutor 
fifteen years before when he was a senior in high school for about a year, during which 
time the juror's daughter and the prosecutor were friends. Id at 1126. Additionally, the 
juror's and the prosecutor's families belonged to the same church organization, and she 
remembered him as a "nice kid." Id The court found that the juror's brief acquaintance 
with the prosecutor was "not the type of relationship that would warrant an inference of 
bias, especially in light of a later statement where she expressed no doubts about her 
ability to decide the case impartially " Id See also State v. Hewitt. 689 P.2d 22, 25-
26 (Utah 1984) (no abuse of discretion in denying challenge for cause to juror who had 
gone to high school twenty years previously with one of the detectives on the case); 
Lacey, 665 P.2d at 1312 (rejecting for-cause challenge to juror recently receiving medical 
treatment from prosecution witness, where although juror stated that "there was a 
'possibility' he might attach more credibility to his acquaintances' testimony than to 
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another person he did not know[,]" he "consistently stated that he would fairly weigh 
their testimony along with all the other testimony presented"). 
Wright was a student of Detective Nudd's fourteen or fifteen years earlier in an 
intensive physical training program (R. 401 A: 264-66). Although Wright suggested he 
might have borne Detective Nudd some ill feeling during the program because of its 
extreme demands, he was later grateful for having gone through it (R. 401A:264-65). In 
answer to whether he held Detective Nudd in such high esteem that it would prevent him 
from being fair and impartial, Wright responded: "I wouldn't say that. I can be fair and 
impartial through all of that" (R. 401 A:266). It is plain from Wright's limited association 
with Detective Nudd, which actually contained an element of ill-feeling, coupled with his 
ready assertion that he would not be biased in favor of the detective's testimony, that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the for-cause challenge. 
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POINT III - BECAUSE RULE 106, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, DOES NOT 
APPLY TO THIS CASE, THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN LIMITING DETECTIVE NUDD'S TESTIMONY, 
WHICH ACCURATELY REPRESENTED DEFENDANT'S 
POST-ARREST STATEMENT AND WAS EVEN LESS DAMAGING 
THAN DEFENDANT'S COMPLETE STATEMENT 
A, Factual Background, 
At trial, Detective Nudd testified concerning remarks defendant made to him 
during a post-arrest interview at the police department later the night of the assault: 
A. He told me that after the shooting started, [] felt there just wasn't 
anything he could do so he continued in the car with them and once the 
accident happened, he said that he was with them, and once they started 
assaulting [the victim], he said he felt like he didn't want to be a punk and 
support his friends, but he didn't know whether or not to do anything to the 
guy. 
Q. Did he say he didn't want to be a punk and just stand there and not do 
anything? 
A. Yes. 
R. 379:39-40. 
Anticipating that defendant would attempt to introduce portions of the transcribed 
record of that interview, prior to Detective Nudd's testifying the prosecution moved to 
exclude those recorded statements as self-serving hearsay (R. 379:2-6, attached at 
Addendum C). In response, defendant argued that he should be allowed to introduce 
other parts under rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 379:4).8 Although the trial court 
8
 Although not explicit in the record (R. 379:4), it is evident that defense counsel 
was referring to the following portion of defendant's recorded statement: 
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recognized that it could not definitively rule until Detective Nudd actually testified, it 
agreed with the prosecution that because the prosecution expected only to elicit Detective 
Nudd's testimony of the interview and not defendant's actual recorded statement, rule 
106 was inapplicable on its express language, and that fairness argued in favor of 
excluding the recorded statements (R. 379:2-3, 6-7). On appeal, defendant claims the 
trial court failed to apply the "rule of completeness" embodied in rule 106. Br. of App. at 
21-30. 
B. Rule 106 Neither Applies to Oral Statements, nor 
Sanctions the Admission of Inadmissible Hearsay, 
Rule 106 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced 
by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any 
other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in 
Defendant: You know what, you tell the truth, you doin something you 
don't feel like doing, like this situation when I was driving and you know 
something is wrong but you can't do nothing about it because you in it 
already, you know. That's the only feeling that was hitting me when they 
were beating up the man, you know, when I see the two of them going at it 
beating up a man not even a man just another person too, another white 
man[] with long hair, it wasn't really hard for me to try to hold them back 
because they are my friends and when they beat the man down, you know 
what my feeling was, you know, should I help them beat up the man or 
should I just stand here, I don't want to be a punk and just stand there and 
not doing nothing and that was the only thing on my mind. If I wasn't the 
one that was shooting, I wasn't the one driving, I would probably of beat 
the man. I know since I tell the truth, that everybody over there that seeing 
the thing, the witnesses over there that would recognize me from when they 
were beating up the man, they know that I wasn't laying a hand on nobody 
that I was trying to hold my boy back, the big one, the one owned the car. 
This was enough you know other people around. I know that I was drunk 
you know. But then again I know what I was doing. 
(R. 401:30-31). 
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fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. 
UtahR.Evid. 106. 
There are no decisions from the Utah courts interpreting this rule. However, 
"[t]his rule is the federal rule, verbatim." See Utah R. Evid. 106 advisory committee 
note. Since the rules are identical, federal interpretations of the rule are persuasive. State 
v. Smith, 817 P.2d 828, 829 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
"For practical reasons, the rule is limited to writings and recorded statements and 
does not apply to conversations." 1972 Advisory committee notes. See also J.Weinstein, 
M. Berger, & J. McLaughlin, Weinstein's Evidence ^ 106[01] at. p. 106-4 ("Rulel06 has 
been limited to writings and recorded statements."). Defendant cites only a single 
relevant case for the application of rule 106 in the circumstances of this case. Br. of App. 
at 25.9 However, substantial federal authority indicates that rule 106 is not applicable on 
9
 Defendant cites United States v. Haddad. 10 F.3d 1252, 1258-59 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(equating rule 106 with rule 611(a), Federal Rules of Evidence, and thereby recognizing 
admissibility of exculpatory oral statement made to police officer to correct a purported 
false inference of guilt). Other cases cited by defendant, see Br. of App. at 24-26, are 
distinguishable because they involve recorded statements. See United States v. Rubin, 
609 F.2d 51, 57-63 (2nd Cir. 1979) (the defendant's extensive reading of agent's notes into 
record justified limited introduction by prosecution of limited portions of notes under rule 
106), affd. 449 U.S. 424, 101 S. Ct. 698 (1981); Rainev v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 784 
F.2d 1523, 1529 n.l 1 (11th Cir. 1986) (two paragraphs of letter published to jury required 
publishing other related paragraphs), affd en banc. 827 F.2d 1498, 1499 (1987), rev'd in 
part on other grounds. 488 U.S. 153, 109 S. Ct.439 (1988); United States v. Walker. 652 
F.2d 708, 709-713 (7th Cir. 1981) (admission of inculpatory portions of defendant's 
testimony at his first trial required admission of additional portions at second trial); State 
v. Dunklev. 39 P.2d 1097, 1105-06 (Utah 1935) (entire post-arrest interview properly 
placed in evidence following introduction of transcribed interview by prosecution). 
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its plain language to oral statements.10 At trial, Detective Nudd had with him defendant's 
transcribed post-arrest interview (R. 379:28-29, 32). However, he testified about the 
interview from his memory, which was refreshed only twice by reference to the 
transcription, and read into the record a only once a portion of the interview unrelated to 
the purportedly misleading statement claimed on appeal (R. 379:32, 36, 38-39). The 
prosecutor never introduced either the transcript or the recorded interview into evidence 
(Exhibit list, R. 197-98). 
Furthermore, even if the rule did apply, it would not serve to admit inadmissible 
hearsay. Detective Nudd's testimony about defendant's post-arrest statements about his 
involvement in the assault were admissible as nonhearsay. See Utah R. Evid. 
801(d)(2)(A) (admission of party opponent offered against the party). However, as the 
trial court noted, the same provision did not permit defendant to introduce other portions 
of his statement (R. 379:3), and defendant offered no other basis for admission other than 
10
 See United States v. Ramirez-Perez. 166 F.3d 1106, 1112-13 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(transcribed interview inadmissible under rule 106 to rebut government agent's oral 
statements regarding interview); Howard v. Moore. 131 F.3d 399, 415 (4 s Cir. 1997) 
(declining to apply rule of completeness under rule 106 where the defendant's 
confessions, although transcribed by government agents, were not introduced into 
evidence in written form); United States v. Collicott. 92 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(recognizing rule 106 inapplicable because no writing or recorded statement was 
introduced by a party); United States v. Wilkerson. 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996), cert, 
denied. _ U.S. _ , 118 S. Ct. 341 (1997) ("The rule applies only to writings or recorded 
statements, not to conversations," citing Fed.R.Evid. 106, advisory committee notes); 
United States v. Harvev. 959 F.2d 1371, 1375 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Rule 106 . . . applies only 
to written and recorded materials."); United States v. Bigelow. 914 F.2d 966, 972 (7th 
Cir. 1990V cert, denied. 498 U.S. 1121, 111 S.Ct. 1077 (1991) (same): United States v. 
Terrv. 702 F.2d 299, 314 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied. 461 U.S. 931 (1983) (admission was not 
mandated rule 106 since it applies only to writings, not oral statements). 
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rule 106 (R. 379:4). Although defendant again cites only a single case for the proposition 
that the rule of completeness, as embodied in rule 106, allows the admission of otherwise 
inadmissible evidence,11 substantial and recent federal authority is contrary.12 Therefore, 
the rule of completeness, as expressed in rule 106, does not apply to this case, and the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit additional transcribed portions 
of the interview. Even if the rule did apply, the trial court still did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing admission of additional portions of the recorded interview. 
C. Purported Exculpatory Portions of Defendant's Post-Arrest 
Interview would not Materially Clarify Detective Nudd's Testimony. 
"Although different circuits have elaborated on rule 106fs "fairness" standard in 
different ways . . . common to all is the requirement that the omitted portion be relevant 
and 'necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the portion already introduced."9 
United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 728 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 
11
 See United States v. Sutton. 801 F.2d 1346, 1368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (rule 106, 
in contradistinction to all the other rules of evidence, should not be restrictively construed 
to exclude otherwise inadmissible evidence). 
12
 See Collicott 92 F.3d at 983 (rejecting admission under rule 106 of 
inadmissible hearsay); Wilkerson, 84 F.3d at 696 (4th Cir. 1996) (rule 106 does "not 
render admissible the evidence which otherwise is inadmissible under hearsay rules") 
(citing United States v. Woolbright 831 F.2d 1390, 1395 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting neither 
rule 106 nor rule 611 authorizes a court to admit unexcepted hearsay); Phoenix 
Associates HI v. Stone. 60 F.3d 95, 103 (2nd Cir.1995) ("Rule 106 'does not compel 
admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence.'") (quoting United States Football 
League v. National Football League. 842 F.2d 1335, 1375-76 (2nd Cir.1988)); United 
States v. Burreson. 643 F.2d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981) (court did not abuse its discretion 
in excluding evidence under rule 106 because it was irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay), 
cert, denied. 454 U.S. 830, 102 S.Ct. 125, 454 U.S. 847, 102 S.Ct. 165, 135 (1981); 
United States v. Costner. 684 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982); see also 1 J. Weinstein & M. 
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, ^ 106[02] at p. 106-12 (1985) (rule 106 addresses only an 
order of proof problem and does not make admissible what is otherwise inadmissible). 
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On direct examination, Detective Nudd testified that during defendant's post-arrest 
interview defendant first gave a false story, asserting that he had never been in Edwin 
Seumanu's car, that he was merely a witness to the events, that he had wrested the gun 
from Edwin, and that he interceded to break up the fight (R. 379:29-34). When informed 
that his conversation with Viliamu in the patrol car had been tape recorded, defendant 
asserted he would then tell the truth, acknowledging that he had been the driver of the 
Monte Carlo, but again claiming that he had tried to pull the Seumanu brothers off the 
victim (R. 379:38-39). When asked what defendant said about his feelings at the end of 
the interview, Detective Nudd answered: 
A. He told me that after the shooting started, felt there just wasn't 
anything he could do so he continued in the car with them and once the 
accident happened, he said that he was with them, and once they started 
assaulting [the victim], he said he felt like he didn't want to be a punk and 
support his friends, but he didn't know whether or not to do anything to the 
guy. 
Q. Did he say he didn't want to be a punk and just stand there and not do 
anything? 
A. Yes. 
R. 379:39-40. Thus, in essence, Detective Nudd testified that defendant was purporting 
to tell the truth when he repeatedly stated that although he had tried to break up the attack 
on Brems, because he was with friends he felt ambivalent about whether to join in the 
assault or to refrain. 
Defendant, however, asserts that Detective Nudd's final testimony led the jury to 
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the mistaken inference that he must have participated in the assault and that the only way 
to correct this mistaken inference was by introducing his complete statement made at the 
end of his interview: 
Defendant: You know what, you tell the truth, you doin something you 
don't feel like doing, like this situation when I was driving and you know 
something is wrong but you can't do nothing about it because you in it 
already, you know. That's the only feeling that was hitting me when they 
were beating up the man, you know, when I see the two of them going at it 
beating up a man not even a man just another person too, another white 
man[] with long hair, it wasn yt really hard for me to try to hold them back 
because they are my friends and when they beat the man down, you know 
what my feeling was, you know, should I help them beat up the man or 
should I just stand here, I don yt want to be a punk and just stand there 
and not doing nothing and that was the only thing on my mind. If I wasn't 
the one that was shooting, I wasn't the one driving, I would probably of 
beat the man. J know since I tell the truth, that everybody over there that 
seeing the thing, the witnesses over there that would recognize me from 
when they were beating up the man, they know that I wasn't laying a 
hand on nobody that I was trying to hold my boy back, the big one, the 
one owned the car. This was enough you know other people around. I 
know that I was drunk you know. But then again I know what I was doing. 
(R. 401:30-31) (emphasis added in Br. of App. at 28). 
It is plain that, since Detective Nudd had already testified to defendant's repeated 
assertions that he had attempted to break up the fight, this expanded statement adds 
nothing "necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the portion already 
introduced," see Branch. 91 F.3d at 728, but rather was cumulative. Indeed, the 
detective's testimony accurately and concisely summarized defendant's ambivalence 
about joining the assault, an expression manifest in defendant's transcribed statement. 
Even if the court abused its discretion in not allowing the introduction of 
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defendant's transcribed statement, any error was harmless. See Haddad, 10 F.3d at 1259 
(improper exclusion under rule 106 harmless where the same information was later 
elicited from a witness). On cross examination, Detective Nudd testified further as to 
defendant's post-arrest statements, reading directly from the transcript: 
I know since I tell the truth that everybody over there that seen the thing, 
the witnesses that were over there, that would recognize me from when they 
were beating up the man. They know that I wasn't laying a hand on 
nobody. That I was trying to hold my boy back, the big one. The one that 
owned the car. 
(R. 379:66). These statements fully express defendant's claim that he tried to hold Edwin 
back, and thus defendant fully achieved his objective in having additional statements 
introduced in evidence. Additionally, defendant testified on his own behalf that he pulled 
Edwin and Viliamu off Brems after they started to beat him (R. 381:35-41). 
Finally, the entire statement given to Detective Nudd by defendant would be more 
harmful.to defendant than the portions that were admitted. Defendant spent the majority 
of the interview denying he was ever in the car and then altering his story (R. 401: 1-19), 
a far more prejudicial outcome than the omission of cumulative evidence. In sum, any 
abuse of discretion in omitting the any portions of the post-arrest interview was harmless. 
POINT IV - DISPOSITION ON DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGES TO UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) SHOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT RULES ON THE STATE'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING IN STATE V. LOPES: 
ALTERNATIVELY, ANY ERROR AS A CONSEQUENCE OF 
LOPES IS HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
Defendant challenged Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) ("group criminal 
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activities" enhancement), on a variety of state and federal constitutional and statutory 
grounds (R. 256-97). The trial court rejected defendant's arguments (R. 369-73), and 
imposed an enhanced sentence (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Application 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1, "Findings," R. 303-05). On appeal, defendant renewed 
those challenges . Br. of App. at 30-48. 
On March 16, 1999, the Utah Supreme Court issued State v. Lopes, No. 960551 
(Utah March 16, 1999). The court concluded that section 76-3-203.1(1), providing for an 
enhanced sentence if a person acted "in concert" with "two or more other persons who 
would be criminally liable for the offense as parties under section 76-2-202," requires that 
"all three actors must (i) have possessed a mental state sufficient to commit the same 
underlying offense and (ii) have directly committed the underlying offense or solicited, 
requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided one of the other two actors to 
engage in conduct constituting the underlying offense. Lopes, slip op. at 5.13 In essence, 
the court concluded, section 76-3-203.1(1), created a new crime which required proof to a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Lopes, slip op. at 6-7. Consequently, the court held 
section 76-3-203.l(5)(c), providing for the trial court's imposing the enhancement upon a 
sufficient finding, unconstitutional. Lopes, slip op. at 8. 
13
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) provides that: "Every person, acting with 
the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another 
person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct." 
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On March 30, 1999, the State petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for rehearing in 
Lopes. In the interest of judicial economy, the State respectfully requests that this Court 
defer its disposition of defendant's challenges to the group criminal activities 
enhancement until the supreme court has ruled on the State's petition.14 
Alternatively, the State asserts that any error in imposing the group criminal 
activities enhancement following Lopes is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Although Lopes now requires that a jury find the "in concert" offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the jury in this case was not so instructed. However, defendant was 
convicted by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault (R. 351) on evidence 
that undeniably showed the primary participation of the Seumanu brothers. Edwin 
Seumanu admitted at trial to being involved in the victim's beating and pleading guilty to 
attempted homicide (R. 379:64, 110). Without objection, the prosecutor proffered at 
defendant's sentencing that both Edwin and Viliamu Seumanu pleaded guilty in this 
matter (R. 380:13). Since all three defendant's were determined guilty of some offense 
related to the assault at the time defendant was sentenced, Lopes' requirement of a jury 
determination of guilt of all those acting in concert beyond a reasonable doubt is fulfilled. 
14
 This Court has already substantially acknowledged the propriety of State's 
request. In State v. Cheenev, No. 970415-CA (Utah App. April i, 1999), this Court 
stayed for many months consideration of the defendant's challenges to section 76-3-203.1 
in recognition that Lopes would be dispositive. Although the Court issued an 
unpublished opinion based on Lopes, it sua sponte stayed the remittitur in that case 
pending disposition of the State's petition for rehearing in Lopes. 
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Lopes, however, also requires that all those acting in concert have the mental 
intent to commit "the same underlying offense" and they actually act as parties under 
section 76-2-202 to the same offense. Lopes, slip op. at 5. Interpreted literally, this 
requirement would preclude imposition of the enhancement on the facts of this case. 
However, Lopes cited with approval and declined to overrule State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 
450 (Utah 1994), wherein the court stated: "Party liability under section 76-2-202 does 
not require that the persons involved in the criminal conduct have the same mental state." 
Id at 461 (emphasis added). Relying on State v. Crick. 675 P.2d 527 (Utah 1983), 
Alvarez further asserted: 
"A defendant can be criminally responsible for an act committed by 
another, but the degree of his responsibility is determined by his own 
mental state in the acts that subject him to such responsibility, not by the 
mental state of the actor. This is clear from the language of § 76-2-202." 
[Crick] at 534. Thus, three persons can be parties to the same criminal 
conduct and each have a different mental state. [Emphasis added.] 
14 at 461. 
Given that Lopes has declined to overrule Alvarez, it may well be that Lopes' 
reference to "the same underlying offense" refers not to precisely the same criminal 
offense, but rather the same unlawful incident in connection with which the parties may 
have different mental states.15 Under that interpretation, and given the admitted (plea) or 
proven culpability of all those acting in concert in this case, any error in not finding 
15
 This point is included in the State's petition for rehearing in Lopes. 
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defendant and the Seumanu brothers guilty of "in concert" crime at trial is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
POINT V - BECAUSE CONSPIRACY AND COMPLICITY ARE 
DISTINGUISHABLE, THE SHONDEL RULE DOES NOT APPLY 
IN THIS CASE 
In State v. ShondeL the Utah Supreme Court held that when two statutes proscribe 
the same criminal conduct, the lesser of the two punishments should be imposed. State v. 
ShondeL 453 P.2d 146, 147-48(Utah 1969). Defendant asserts that section 76-3-203.1, 
proscribing "in concert" criminal activity, and Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1995), 
proscribing conspiracy, make criminal the same conduct. Br. of App. at 48. However, he 
argues, because conviction of a second degree felony results in an enhanced six year 
minimum term, whereas conviction for conspiracy to commit a second degree felony 
results in a maximum zero-to-five year term, he should have been sentenced to only the 
latter term.16 Even assuming the authority of Lopes, concluding that in concert criminal 
liability constitutes a new crime, defendant's argument misapprehends the nature of 
conspiracy and accomplice liability. 
The inquiry under Shondel focuses on '"whether the . . . statutes at issue proscribe 
exactly the same conduct, i.e., do they contain the same elements?m Kent, 945 P.2d at 
16
 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.l(3)(d) (1995) ("If the offense is a second 
degree felony, the convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of 
six years in prison."); Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-202(3) (Supp. 1998) ("Conspiracy to 
commit... (3) a second degree felony is a third degree felony")(3) (Supp. 1998) 
("Conspiracy to commit... (3) a second degree felony is a third degree felony."). 
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147 (quoting State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986)). "If the statutes do not 
require proof of the same elements, the defendant may be charged under the statute 
carrying the more severe sentence." Fisher, 972 P.2d at 98 (citing Kent, 945 P.2d at 147). 
"[A] person is guilty of conspiracy when he, intending that conduct constituting a 
crime be performed, agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the 
performance of such conduct Utah Code Ann.§ 76-4-201 (1995). In cases too 
numerous to cite courts have recognized that the gravamen of conspiracy is the 
agreement to commit the criminal act.17 Accomplice liability, on the other hand, 
requires not an agreement, but rather only that a party act as an aider and abettor, to wit: 
that he directly commit the offense or "solicitf], request[], command[], encourage[], or 
intentionally aid[] another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense/1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995). This distinction, plain on the face of the statutes, 
has been recognized in other jurisdictions. See People v. Luparello. 231 Cal.Rptr. 832, 
849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) ("[T]he conspirator need only intend to agree or conspire and 
to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy . . . while the aider and 
abettor must intend to commit the offense or to encourage or facilitate its 
commission.") (citations omitted); State ex rel. Woods v. Cohen. 844 p.2d 1147, 1150 
17
 See, e ^ , United States v. Jobe. 101 F.3d 1046, 1061 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he 
gravamen of [conspircy] is the agreement to commit a crime."); United States v. Burgos, 
94 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996) (same). 
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(Ariz. 1992) (recognizing "a logical distinction between agreeing to the commission of 
a crime by another and agreeing to aid another in committing a crime, the latter being 
more participatory than the former) (emphasis in original).18 
The facts of this case do not indicate any plan or agreement among defendant 
and the Seumanus to commit an assault. Rather, the offense was spontaneously 
committed by all three participatnts. Because proof of conspiracy would require the 
proof of an additional criminal element, the Shondel rule does is inapplicable. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ? day of April, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
-^-^ 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
18
 At oral argument in Lopes, the court considered the argument that the group 
criminal activities enhancement actually constituted conspiracy. However, it is evident 
from the issued decision that an "agreement" to commit an offense is not an element of 
the new crime of "in concert" criminal liability that the court has constructed. Lopes, slip 
op. at 5 (stating only that those acting in concert must have the mental intent to commit 
the same offense and act as aiders or abettors in the commission of the offense). 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
76-1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in 
a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads 
the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other 
manner that he is in control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act 
and the actor is capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, govern-
ment, partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise 
dominion or control over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to 
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, 
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function 
of any bodily member or organ. 
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, 
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of 
recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being 
preserved. 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission 
of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons 
— Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in concert 
with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense 
as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means 
the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable for 
the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(2) (a) Theprosecutingattomey, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, 
shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or 
the information or indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is 
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. The notice 
shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the substantive 
offense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subse-
quently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include 
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any 
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the 
allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or more persons, 
or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially 
prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are: 
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum term of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison. 
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison. 
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life sentence is imposed, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years in 
prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, 
regarding drug-related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-
6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 
76-6-520; 
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3, Title 
76, Chapter 8, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 
76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in 
Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses 
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety 
Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering 
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an 
enhanced penalty for the primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section 
that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those 
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to 
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the 
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this 
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence 
required under this section if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the 
record and in writing. 
76-4-201. Conspiracy — Elements of offense. 
For purposes of this part a person is guilty of conspiracy when he, intending 
that conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees with one or more 
persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct and any one of 
them commits an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy, except where the 
offense is a capital offense, a felony against the person, arson, burglary, or 
robbery, the overt act is not required for the commission of conspiracy. 
76-4-202. Conspiracy — Classification of offenses. 
Conspiracy to commit: 
(1) a capital felony is a first degree felony; 
(2) a first degree felony is a second degree felony; except that conspiracy 
to commit child kidnaping, in violation of Section 76-5-301.1 or to commit 
any of those felonies described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, which are 
first degree felonies, is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment 
for an indeterminate term of not less than three years and which may be 
for life; 
(3) a second degree felony is a third degree felony; 
(4) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor; 
(5) a class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor; 
(6) a class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor; 
(7) A class C misdemeanor is punishable by a penalty not exceeding one 
half the penalty for a class C misdemeanor. 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (lXa) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a third degree felony. 
Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or recorded 
statements. 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a 
party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other 
part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be 
considered contemporaneously with it. 
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chambers panel member No. 8, Steven Richard Wright. 
Mr. Wright, in court, sir, I believe you responded to a 
question wherein you stated that you know or have some 
familiarity with Det. Nudd. Was that your response? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How do you know Det. Nudd? 
A. It was about 14 years ago, 15 years ago, I 
was part of an explorer program that he was an advisor o 
at the time. 
Q. How long ago you say? 
A. 14 or 15 years ago. 
Q. And please forgive my ignorance. When you 
were in an explorer program 14 years ago, how regularly 
would you meet with Det. Nudd? 
A. I was only involved with him. It was they 
called it an academy-type thing. I was actually with 
Sandy City explorer and he was with West Valley and they 
combined the two for approximately a month and a half 
period of time. Everyday for that period of time just t 
give us the basics of law enforcement and stuff at the 
time. That is the only time I ever really been around 
him. 
Q. Since that experience, have you had any 
contact with Det. Nudd? 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. How many kids were in the program? 
A. Quite a few, I would say probably around 50. 
Q. Did you say you were the Sandy? 
A. Sandy City, yes. 
Q. So what occasion did Det. Nudd have to 
supervision your work? 
A. He was our physical education instructor and 
he also instructed a few of the classes that were taught. 
Specifically, I can't remember. 
Q. It is not a situation where you get graded or 
anything of that nature, is it? 
A. We were graded on our tests and our 
performance and everything. We received a fancy piece of 
paper at the end of it, but nothing else. 
Q. As a result of that experience, how old were 
you then? 
A. I was 16 or 17 at the time. 
Q. As a result of that experience, did you form 
any opinion or impressions or conclusions about Det. Nudd? 
A. I know at the time it was hard because he was 
pushing us to exercise and stuff real hard at the time, 
but no, not now. I got over it right after. I realized 
it was something good that happened to me and not bad. 
Q. Did I take from your remarks that at the time 
you were going through it, it was physically challenging? 
266 
A. Very physically challenging for me, yes. 
Q. Do you think that you could fairly and 
impartial evaluate the testimony of Det. Nudd if you were 
a juror and he were called as a witness? 
A. Yes. I hold no grudges or anything like that 
against him. At the time, it was just emotions with me 
because we were going through exercising and this, and I 
wasn't used to it and after the program furnished I was 
grateful that I was put through that. 
Q. Do you hold him in such high esteem that that 
also would prevent you from being fair and impartial? 
A. I wouldn't say that. I can be fair and 
impartial through all of that. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. (Juror left 
chambers). 
Let's start with you, Mr. Castle. Based on 
what you have heard so far, I recognize there may be some 
subsequent answers when we return to court. You wish to 
challenge Mr. Wright for cause? 
MR. CASTLE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Remal? 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I would challenge him. 
It appears to me from what he has told us is though at the 
time it was a hard thing, and perhaps he didn't like Det. 
Nudd too much because he pushed them too hard. Shortly 
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afterwards he realized Det. Nudd did the right thing and 
challenged him, and he rose to that challenge and thinks 
highly of him as a result of that. 
This is apparently the kind of situation, and I 
am not familiar with the explorer program, where young 
people are being taught things by adults and in most 
situations where that situation occurs the adults are 
respected and held in high esteem. And for that reason, I 
am concerned that he would undoubtedly give weight to 
Det. Nudd's testimony. 
THE COURT: The record should reflect that I am 
going to, at this point anyway, deny the challenge for 
cause for Mr. Wright. The court is satisfied considering 
how long ago that experience occurred with Det. Nudd and 
the panel member's age at the time. 
Furthermore, the panel member, in this court's 
view anyway, was fairly persuasive that he could remain 
fair and impartial despite the fact that apparently it was 
a physical task to make it through the exercise explorer 
program with Det. Nudd teaching it. This court does not 
believe there is an inadequate basis to challenge him for 
cause at this point. 
You need to bring in panel member No. 13, 
Ms. Lott. (Pause) The record should reflect we now have 
in chambers panel member No. 13: Ms. Lot. 
ADDENDUM C 
statement, I would make another objection to that on 
different grounds and that is the ground of foundation. 
At least thus far Officer McCarthy has not identified the 
names of the individuals or even which individual said the 
statement or said what part of the statement. And so 
based on that foundation objection, I renew. 
THE COURT: Let me say this. I am going to 
require Mr. Castle to lay that foundation depending upon 
what the officer's testimony is. You can chose to renew 
your objection at that time. 
MS. REMAL: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything else we need to resolve 
before we bring the jury in? 
MR. CASTLE: Your Honor, is that one issue 
concerning our Motion in Limine, the one involving a 
request to prohibit defense counsel from asking other 
witnesses' statements made by the defendant that are 
considered or would be considered self-serving. I realize 
in making the motion, I am doing it somewhat in a vacuum 
because you have yet to hear what those questions are and 
I understand that. 
THE COURT: I do wish to stop you there, if it is 
okay. 
MR. CASTLE: Of course. 
THE COURT: You are correct. You are asking me 
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to do it in a vacuum and I make a point of making it the 
rare occasion that I rule in a vacuum. It is important 
for me to hear the question in the context of the 
testimony so I can determine whether or not there is an 
appropriate objection or not. 
The best I can say to the two of you on this 
issue is that I have reviewed your Memo and let me say, I 
didn't review it last night. I actually reviewed it in 
preparation for, for some reasons, I reviewed it in 
preparation for trial as to the other two co-defendants. 
I didn't review it last night but I am familiar with the 
issue and in general terms since I don't have it in 
context I would have to say I don't think it constitutes 
an admission by a party because it would not be offered 
against the party. It would be offered by Ms. Remal and 
consequently in this court's view it will still constitute 
hearsay. That is my view of the issue right now, but I 
want to be able to rule on the situation question by 
question. 
MR. CASTLE: Your Honor, what I was simply 
attempting to do is, I think it has been accomplished, is 
getting the argument out of the way, in terms of just 
general principles, and go from there. Like I said in 
chambers, that was the reason I had filed the motion just 
so that the court knew the State's position so that as 
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happens occasionally, time is not wasted in discussing the 
issue, and then discussing the issue in front of the jury. 
So we can proceed at this point. I am prepared to go 
forward. 
THE COURT: Ms. Remal. 
MS. REMAL: Also for the record, as I indicated 
in chambers, my argument on that issue, and that is about 
the defendant's statement to Detective Nudd, is that rule 
106 governs which is entitled remainder of or related 
writing or recorded statements, which indicates that when 
a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is 
introduced by a party, an adverse party, may require the 
introduction at that time of any other part or any other 
writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness be 
considered contemporaneously with it. 
It is my understanding that part of the statement 
that Mr. Castle is going to attempt to elicit from Det. 
Nudd is in deed part of a video tape statement of an 
interview between Detective Nudd and Mr. Leleae and that 
what Mr. Castle wants to do is elicit some parts of that 
statement, but not allow me to elicit other parts of that 
statement. And in my view, Rule 106 gives the court at 
least the discretion to determine whether or not fairness 
should require that all of the statement be allowed into 
evidence instead of just one part thereof or some parts. 
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THE COURT: And I think we should at least place 
on the record what Mr. Castle's position was as to 
Rule 106. 
MR. CASTLE: Your Honor, it is the State's 
position Rule 106 does not apply unless I am attempting to 
actually introduce the recorded statement; i.e., the video 
tape or a writing which I am not attempting to do. I 
simply will ask Detective Nudd what statements the 
defendant made to him. 
Now it is true that the police department, out of 
an effort to document their case, out of an effort to 
fairness, tape recorded and video recorded the interview 
with the defendant. I do not believe that 106 was ever 
intended to cover such an event. And what we are talking 
about is officers not recording these statements. If the 
rule -- If a court, if this court rules that somehow 
Rule 106 supersedes 801(d)2 then I would submit that it 
simply does not. And it simply is a back door attempt to 
overcome the fact that the self-serving statements are 
hearsay. It is an attempt of not requiring the defendant 
to take the stand and be cross examined as to the veracity 
of those self-serving statements. That is the purpose for 
801(d)2. Not to give the defendant the benefit of having 
his statements heard and not taking the stand. In other 
words, having his cake and eat it too. 
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But if he has self-serving statements to make, 
then he shouldn't be required to take the stand. 
Commentators on the Rules of Evidence have long recognized 
that self-serving statements do not contain the veracity 
as a statement against a party opponent, when it is 
offered against that party opponent. But because of the 
lack of veracity, the requirement is that whoever made 
that statement, in this context the defendant, he is 
required to take the stand so he can be tested. And 106 
is not an exception 801(d)2. It applies to a different 
situation than the State plans, applies to a different 
course of action than the State plans in this case and 
Rule 106, Your Honor, has been around for some time. I 
would say long before video tape recordings were around, 
and I suspect, though I don't know, Rule 106 is based on a 
former rule prior to the time that we even had tape 
recorders that were used by law enforcement. So I don't 
believe that that rule overcomes the hearsay objection 
that I would have it as well because of the unreliability 
of self-serving statements. That is our position. 
THE COURT: I am going to deny the request for 
admission under 106. First of all, based upon its express 
language I am not satisfied it applies. Even if it were 
to apply, I am of the opinion that the competing interest 
of -- well, let me restate that. 
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That the nature of self-serving statements do not 
persuade this court that I ought to exercise discretion 
under Rule 106 and allow any remaining portions of the 
statement to come in because of fairness. In this court's 
view at this point, the fairness argues in favor of 
keeping out the self-serving statements. Any other issues 
we need to resolve before we bring the jury in? 
MS. REMAL: Not that I am aware of. 
MR. CASTLE: No. 
THE COURT: Do we have Officer McCarthy 
available? 
MR. CASTLE: We do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let's get the jury in. Let me also 
tell you that I am expecting to take a shorter lunch break 
than we did previously. I am going to take a break not 
longer than 45 minutes. So you need to adjust the calling 
of your witnesses accordingly. (Pause) 
THE COURT: The record by reflect the jury is now 
present in the courtroom. You may retake the witness 
stand. You may go forward, counsel. 
MR. CASTLE: Your Honor, may I have an exhibit 
marked? 
THE COURT: You may. 
